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Abstract
We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural numberM
such that all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the discounted
repeated prisoners’ dilemma can be obtained by subgame perfect equi-
librium strategies with the following property: current play depends
only on the number of the time-index and on the history of the lastM
periods. Therefore, players who are restricted to using pure strategies,
have to remember, at the most, M periods in order to play any equi-
librium outcome of the discounted repeated prisoners’ dilemma. This
result leads us to introduce the notion of time dependent complexity,
and to conclude that in the repeated prisoners’ dilemma, restricting
attention to finite time dependent complex strategies is enough.
∗We are grateful to Narayana Kocherlakota, and Andy McLennan for their valuable
advice and support. Special thanks are due to Hamid Sabourian for very detailed com-
ments. We benefited from discussions in, and thank the participants of the Applied Mi-
croeconomics Workshop at the University of Minnesota, and the Mathematical Economics
Workshop at the Bilkent University. We thank John Huffstot for editorial assistance. Any
remaining errors are ours.
1
1 Introduction
Repeated games provide a framework in which long-term relationships can
be analyzed. In particular, the repeated version of the prisoners’ dilemma
can be used to study whether or not it is possible for two individuals to
cooperate even when they have a short-term incentive for not doing so. The
well-known answer displays that the possibility of cooperation depends on
how patient agents are. If the weight that players assign to future payoffs
is sufficiently high, then cooperation will be a (subgame perfect) equilibrium
outcome path.
Because players do not possess a short-term incentive to cooperate, in any
equilibrium strategy that results in cooperation, current play must depend
on past play. Therefore, players have to remember the past in order for
cooperation to arise as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In this paper, we ask how much do players have to remember in order to
play the discounted repeated prisoners’ dilemma. In our view, this question
is important insomuch as we regard strategies that depend less on memory
as being more attractive to players, which will be the case whenever remem-
bering the past has costs.
We show that time dependent bounded recall strategies are enough to
play the discounted repeated prisoners’ dilemma with pure strategies. More
precisely, given the discount factor, we show that there is a natural numberM
such that all subgame perfect equilibrium outcome paths can be obtained by
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in which current play depends only on
the number of the time-index and on what has transpired in the lastM rounds
of play. Thus, players have to remember no more than M periods in order to
play any equilibrium outcome of the discounted repeated prisoners’ dilemma.
In particular, no equilibrium outcome requires an unbounded memory.
To see what is behind our main result, consider the cooperative outcome.
This outcome can be obtained as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome with
the grim-trigger strategy, provided that the discount factor is high enough.
In the grim-trigger strategy, any player in any round observes the complete
history up to that round and will cooperate whenever the outcome has been
cooperative in all the previous rounds; otherwise, he will not cooperate. In
particular, in any round players’ play will be affected by the outcome in
the first round. Hence, the grim-trigger strategy requires unbounded recall.
Fortunately, cooperation can also be obtained in equilibrium using an alter-
native strategy that requires less memory: players start by cooperating; in
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the following stages of the game, each player cooperates if and only if they
both have cooperated in the previous stage. Clearly, this strategy requires
only one memory. In effect, what we show is that if an outcome can be
implemented by a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, it can also be im-
plemented by a bounded recall subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, where
the bound does not exceed M .
Although we have been able to obtain a strong result for the repeated pris-
oners’ dilemma, it appears that our tools are not easily extended to other
games. Part of the difficulty of analyzing bounded recall strategies in the
framework of this paper comes from restricting players to play pure strate-
gies. In fact in Barlo and Carmona (2003) and Sabourian (1989) general
characterizations using bounded recall strategies are obtained when players
have a rich strategy space (e.g., when they can play mixed strategies or when
they have a connected set of pure strategies).
Prisoners’ dilemma has been the focus of analysis in the complexity litera-
ture: Aumann (1981), following Simon’s bounded rationality ideas, suggested
that a strategy is more intuitive if in every period the behavior depends on
a finite number of states, i.e., if it is implemented by a finite automata.
Aumann’s suggestion was then followed by Neyman (1985) and Rubinstein
(1986), who pioneered the analysis of complexity in the prisoners’ dilemma.
In contrast, we do not employ finite automata strategies to model limited
memory. Instead time dependent bounded recall separates knowledge of the
time of play from that regarding the past moves, a notion used in Cole and
Kocherlakota (2000) and Barlo and Carmona (2003). Consequently, even a
time dependent zero-recall strategy might be of infinite complexity, which is
due to the action plan varying across time (see Barlo and Carmona (2003)
for a more elaborate discussion).
Our formulation is also distinguished from the one used by Aumann
(1981) and others in the following important aspect. In the papers men-
tioned above, each player’s automaton is such that its input consists only of
the actions of his opponent. In particular, each player will choose the same
action in two different histories provided that his opponent has chosen the
same actions; this is so even if his own actions are distinct. In contrast, the
strategies that we use do not have this property; in fact, players have to
condition their behavior in their own past actions in order for our result to
hold. Thus, we follow the formulation given in Kalai and Stanford (1988),
and hence, work with unmodified notions of strategies and equilibria.
Another significance of this research involves the introduction of the no-
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tion of time dependent complexity, henceforth tdc. We follow standard inter-
pretation of strategies in extensive form games, therefore, we regard a strat-
egy to be a history contingent plan that is written before the game starts.
Therefore, we can imagine each player having an almanac that has countably
many pages, each page corresponding to a time period. Consequently, in this
interpretation each agent writes his plan of action into his almanac before
the game starts. Given a natural number K, a strategy profile is of at most
K − tdc, if each agent cannot write more than K entries on any one of the
pages of his almanac.
Our main result can then be restated to show that in the prisoners’
dilemma (pure strategies), restricting attention to at most K− tdc strategies
is enough, that is, any subgame equilibrium outcome path can be obtained
with an (at most) K − tdc subgame perfect equilibrium strategy.
2 Notation and Definitions
The prisoners’ dilemma is described as a normal form game G with two
players (N = {1, 2}), each of which having two actions: Ai = {C,D} for
i = 1, 2. Players’ payoff functions are described by the following table:
1\2 C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 1, 1
We denote player i’s payoff function by ui : A → R, for i = 1, 2 and A =
A1 × A2.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the discount factor, common to both players. The
discount factor will be fixed throughout the analysis. The supergame of G
consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G taking place in periods
t = 1, 2, 3, . . . . In period t the players make simultaneous moves denoted by
ati ∈ Ai and then each player learns his opponent’s move.
We assume that players have complete information. For k ≥ 1, a k−stage
history is a k−length sequence hk = (a1, . . . , ak), where, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
at ∈ A; the space of all k−stage histories is Hk, i.e., Hk = Ak (the k−fold
Cartesian product of A). We use e for the unique 0–stage history — it is a
0–length history that represents the beginning of the supergame. The set of
all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn.
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For every h ∈ H, define hr ∈ A to be the projection of h onto its rth
coordinate. For every h ∈ H we let `(h) denote the length of h. For two
positive length histories h and h¯ in H we define the concatenation of h and
h¯, in that order, to be the history (h · h¯) of length `(h) + `(h¯): (h · h¯) =
(h1, h2, . . . , h`(h), h¯1, h¯2, . . . , h¯`(h¯)).We follow the convention that e·h = h·e =
h for every h ∈ H.
For a history h ∈ H and an integer 0 ≤ m ≤ `(h) − 1, the m-stage tail
of h is denoted by Tm(h) ∈ H : T 0(h) = e and (Tm(h))j = h`(h)−(m+1)+j for
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and 1 ≤ m ≤ `(h) − 1. We also follow the convention that
Tm(h) = h, for all m ≥ `(h).
It is assumed that at stage k each player knows hk, that is, each player
knows the actions that were played in all previous stages. As is common in
this area of research, e.g. Kalai and Stanford (1988), limited memory will
be modelled by restricting the strategies that players are allowed to use, and
not agents’ knowledge of the history of the game.
Players choose behavioral strategies, that is, in each stage k, they select
a function from Hk−1 to Ai denoted fki , for player i ∈ N . The set of player
i’s strategies is denoted by Fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi is the joint strategy space.
Finally, a strategy vector is f =
({
fki
}∞
k=1
)
i∈N .
Given an individual strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H we denote the
individual strategy induced at h by fi|h. This strategy is defined pointwise
on H: (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯), for every h¯ ∈ H. We will use (f |h) to denote
(f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ S and h ∈ H. We let Fi(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈ H}
and F (f) = {f |h : h ∈ H}.
Given a strategy of player i, fi ∈ Fi, we say that fi has time dependent
recall of order m, rec(fi) = m, if m is the smallest integer satisfying the
property: fi(h) = fi(h¯) for all k ∈ N, and all h, h¯ ∈ Hk satisfying Tm(h) =
Tm(h¯). If such an m does not exist, we say that rec(fi) = ∞. We let Fmi
be the set of all player i’s strategies with recall of order at most m, and
Fm =
∏
i∈N F
m
i .
Any strategy f ∈ F induces an outcome pi(f) as follows:
pi1(f) = f(e) pik(f) = f(pi1(f), . . . , pik−1(f)),
for k ∈ N. Thus, we have defined a function pi : F → A∞, where A∞ =
A× A× · · · .
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The payoff in the supergame of G is, for δ ∈ (0, 1), the discounted sum
of stage game payoffs:
Ui(f) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δk−1ui(pik(f)).
Let Vi : A
∞ → R be defined by Vi(a∞) = (1 − δ)
∑∞
k=1 δ
k−1ui(ak); then
Ui = Vi ◦ pi.
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of the supergame of G if
for all i ∈ N , Ui(f) ≥ Ui(fˆi, f−i) for all fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame of G if every f¯ ∈ F (f) is a
Nash equilibrium. We let SPE denote the set of subgame perfect equilibria
and E = pi(SPE) denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Also, we let Em = pi(SPE ∩ Fm) be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
outcomes that can be obtained by subgame perfect equilibrium strategies
with recall no greater than m.
3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Our main result is:
Theorem 1 There exists M ∈ N such that E = EM .
The main idea of the proof is as follows: Consider any subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome pi. The subgame perfect M -recall strategy we use to
obtain the given subgame perfect equilibrium outcome pi, is as follows: If
the last M periods of a given history agree with the given outcome pi, then
player i chooses as specified by the outcome. Otherwise, player i chooses D.
This construction requires a player to distinguish, by remembering in a
finite number of periods, if there were any deviations from the given equilib-
rium outcome pi. Hence, first we have to analyze subgame perfect outcomes
which involve unbounded sequences of consecutive (D,D)s, because clearly
such a path cannot be distinguished from a punishment path using finite
recall.
Lemma 1 displays that if from some period on, (D,D) will be played for
the remainder of the game, then that period must be the first period of the
game. This outcome consists of repeating the Nash equilibrium of the stage
game, and thus, no memory is needed to implement it. Then, in Lemma 2
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we show that unless defection starts in the first period, no equilibrium path
will entail unbounded sequences of consecutive (D,D)s.
These properties are necessary for our result, since they guarantee that
players can then conclude as to whether they are in the equilibrium path or
in the punishment path. But they are not enough. The reason is that our
construction critically depends on the following property: after a deviation
from the given equilibrium outcome pi, the behavior induced by the strategy
we employ should result in a defection path for the remainder of the game.
The example below is designed to demonstrate this point:
Assume that the discount factor is sufficiently high, so that the following
path is a subgame perfect outcome:
pi = ((C,D), (D,D), (D,D), (C,D), (C,D), (C,C), (C,C), . . . , (C,C), . . .) .
In light of Lemma 2, for the given discount factor suppose that the longest
consecutive sequence of (D,D)s is 2, as in the above given outcome. Suppose
that the memory figure to be used is 4. Assume that player 1 plays D in the
first period. Hence, we wish the resulting outcome to be given by repeating
(D,D) forever. But now consider player 1 deviating in the punishment phase
and playing C in periods 4 and 5. Then the outcome of the first 5 periods
is ((D,D), (D,D), (D,D), (C,D), (C,D)). Since the history of the last 4
periods coincides with the equilibrium path, players will play (C,C) forever.
Hence, a unilateral deviation does not necessarily lead to (D,D) forever.
This problem is easily solved. The length of the longest consecutive se-
quence of Ds played by any of the players in this outcome is 5. Then, one
easily shows that players need to remember at most 6 periods. In general,
if the length of the longest consecutive sequence of Ds played by any of the
players in an outcome is finite, then this outcome can be implemented with
a time dependent bounded recall equilibrium.
Our result then follows from our Lemma 3 below, which proves that unless
defection starts in the first period, no equilibrium path will entail unbounded
sequences of consecutive Ds for any of the players. Thus, confusing instances
such as the one above are eliminated by setting the memory size high enough
to ensure that a deviating player cannot “trick” the other.
Lemma 1 Let pi ∈ E be such that
pin = (D,D) for all n ≥ k, (1)
for some k ∈ N. Then, k = 1.
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Remark 1 Note that such a subgame perfect outcome is easily obtained as
a result of a 0-recall strategy: players play defect in every period independent
from the history.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let pi be a subgame perfect outcome satisfying
condition (1). We may assume that k is the minimum j ∈ N such that n ≥ j
implies pin = (D,D). Suppose, in order to reach a contradiction, that k > 1.
Then, k − 1 ∈ N and the minimality of k implies that pik−1 6= (D,D).
Note that in period k − 1 the outcome cannot be D for player i and
C for player j, for i 6= j, otherwise player j would clearly deviate. Hence,
pik−1 = (C,C).
Thus, in period k − 1 player 1’s payoff is 3 + (1 − δ)∑∞t=1 δt · 1 = 3 + δ.
However, by deviating and choosing D in period k−1 player 1 would receive
a payoff of 4 + (1 − δ)∑∞t=1 δt · 1 = 4 + δ. This contradicts the assumption
that pi is a subgame perfect outcome.
Let E˜ ( E be the set of equilibrium outcomes that do not satisfy (1). For
pi ∈ E˜, let k1 be the first period in which players play (D,D); if it does not
exist, we let k1 = 0. Let K1 be the maximal k ∈ N satisfying pij = (D,D)
for all k1 ≤ j ≤ k, unless k1 = 0, in which case we let K1 = 0. We refer
to the (finite) sequence {pik1 , . . . , piK1} as the first sequence of consecutive
(D,D)s under pi. Assuming that k1, k2, . . . , kn−1 and K1, K2, . . . , Kn−1 have
been defined, we let kn be the first period after Kn−1 in which players play
(D,D); again, if it does not exist, we let kn = 0. In this latter case letKn = 0,
while if kn > 0 we let Kn be the maximal k ∈ N satisfying pij = (D,D) for
all kn ≤ j ≤ k. The sequence {pikn , . . . , piKn} is called the nth sequence of
consecutive (D,D)s under pi. Finally, let Mn = Mn(pi) be the length of n
th
sequence of consecutive (D,D)s under pi, i.e., Mn = Kn − kn + 1.
Lemma 2 There exists B ∈ N such that supn∈NMn(pi) ≤ B for all pi ∈ E˜.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists pi ∈ E˜, and n ∈ N such that
1 − δ > 4δMn(pi)+1 and kn > 1. By the definition of Kn−1 and kn, it follows
that in period kn−1 the outcome is different from (D,D). Let i ∈ N be such
that pikn−1i = C. Suppose that player i deviates and plays D from period
kn − 1 onwards, giving rise to an outcome p˜i. Note that we have ui(p˜ikn−1)−
ui(pi
kn−1) = 1, ui(p˜ik)−ui(pik) ≥ 0 for kn ≤ k ≤ Kn and ui(p˜ik)−ui(pik) ≥ −4
for k > Kn. Hence,
Vi(p˜i)− Vi(pi) ≥ δkn−2
[
(1− δ)− 4δMn+1] > 0. (2)
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Thus, player i has an incentive to deviate in period kn − 1 from pi, which
contradicts the assumption that pi is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
Let i ∈ {1, 2} and pi ∈ E˜; we will define the length of the nth sequence
of consecutive Ds played by player i under pi. Let ki1 be the first period in
which player i plays D; if it does not exist, we let ki1 = 0. Let K
i
1 be the
maximal k ∈ N satisfying piji = D for all ki1 ≤ j ≤ k, unless ki1 = 0, in which
case we let K i1 = 0. Assuming that k
i
1, k
i
2, . . . , k
i
n−1 and K
i
1, K
i
2, . . . , K
i
n−1
have been defined, we let kin be the first period after K
i
n−1 in which player
i plays D; again, if it does not exist, we let kin = 0. In this latter case let
K in = 0, while if k
i
n > 0 we let K
i
n be the maximal k ∈ N satisfying piji = D
for all kin ≤ j ≤ k. Finally, let M in =M in(pi) be the length of nth sequence of
consecutive Ds played by player i under pi, i.e., M in = K
i
n − kin + 1.
Lemma 3 For every i = 1, 2, there exists Bi ∈ N such that supn∈NM in(pi) ≤
Bi for all pi ∈ E˜.
Proof. Suppose not. Let B be given by Lemma 2. Then there exists i ∈
{1, 2}, pi ∈ E˜, and n ∈ N such that 1− δ > 4δM in(pi)−B and M in(pi) > B. This
last condition implies that there exists kin ≤ k ≤ K in such that pik 6= (D,D)
and so, pik−i = C. In fact, k ≤ kin +B.
Suppose that player −i deviates and plays D from period k onwards,
giving rise to an outcome p˜i. Note that we have ui(p˜i
k)−ui(pik) = 1, ui(p˜il)−
ui(pi
l) ≥ 0 for k ≤ l ≤ Kin and ui(p˜il)− ui(pil) ≥ −4 for l > Kin. Hence,
Vi(p˜i)− Vi(pi) ≥ δk−1
[
(1− δ)− 4δKin−k+1
]
≥ δk−1
[
(1− δ)− 4δM in−B
]
> 0.
(3)
Thus, player −i has an incentive to deviate in period k from pi, which con-
tradicts the assumption that pi is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
We can now prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let pi ∈ E. By Remark 1, we may assume that pi ∈
E˜. Let B, B1, B2 be as in Lemmas 2 and 3, and let B∗ = max{B,B1, B2}.
Thus, we have that Mn, M
1
n and M
2
n are all less than or equal to B
∗ for all
n ∈ N.
Define fi as follows: start by playing according to the path pi; i.e., fi(e) =
pi1. For an arbitrary h ∈ Hk, k ∈ N, let:
fi(h) =
{
pik+1i if T
B∗+1(h) = (pik−B, . . . , pik)
D otherwise.
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This definition implies that if player i deviates unilaterally from pi in
period k, then (D,D) will be played in all periods t ≥ k + 1. This follows
because player −i will be able to observe the deviation on the first B∗ + 1
periods after it has occurred, which will lead to a sequence in which he plays
D for B∗ + 1 periods; after that, since along the equilibrium path player −i
plays at most B∗ consecutive Ds, it follows that the (B∗ + 1)−stage tail of
the history following the deviation can never be consistent with equilibrium
play; thus, he keeps playing D forever.
Obviously, rec(f) = B∗ + 1 and pi(f) = pi. Furthermore, since pi ∈ E,
then f is a subgame perfect equilibrium. So, set M = B∗ + 1.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies a notion of limited memory and complexity in the repeated
discounted prisoners’ dilemma with the additional feature that agents may
use time in their behavior.
Implementing equilibrium outcomes of any discounted repeated game by
finite recall strategies involves the following essential aspects: First, the equi-
librium outcome and its associated punishment paths have to be such that
players can distinguish them by employing finite recall strategies. Second,
those paths must obey the property that players can precisely identify who
has deviated.
In the case of the prisoners’ dilemma, the first difficulty was solved by
Lemmas 1 and 2, whereas Lemma 3 deals with the second. The fact that
in the prisoners’ dilemma the most severe punishment path is the same for
both players and has a simple structure1 enables us to overcome the above
difficulties.
Our approach allows us to introduce a new notion of complexity modelled
as follows: Note that for any strategy fi, there exists a function gi : Ωi ×
N → Ai and a function Ti : H → Ωi such that fi(h) = gi(Ti(h), n) for all
h ∈ Hn, all n ∈ N and all i = 1, 2.2 We then say that a strategy fi is of
at most K−time dependent complexity if it can be represented as above by
(Ωi, Ti, gi) with |Ωi| ≤ K. In this representation, one can imagine that each
player possesses an almanac that (1) has countably many pages, each page
1That is, it consists of repetitions of the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
2Simply let Ωi = H, Ti be the identity function and gi(h, n) = fi(h) for all h ∈ H and
n ∈ N.
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corresponding to a time period, and (2) cannot contain more than K entries
on any page. The number K then provides us partial information about the
complexity of the almanac.3
For the strategies establishing Theorem 1, we can let Ωi = A
M and Ti =
TM . In particular, Ωi is finite; thus, the following corollary is then just a
reformulation of our main result:
Corollary 1 There is M ∈ N such that for any pi ∈ E, there is a subgame
perfect equilibrium strategy f with at mostM-time dependent complexity such
that pi(f) = pi.
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